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Abstract
The social transformations following the "gentle revolutions" of 1989 had profound effects 
upon East European societies. Many texts emerged analysing "post-communist transition" as 
a phenomenon, but they were usually based upon experience of one, or a small range, of 
countries and generalising from them. However, since that time divergent paths of 
transformation have emerged between these post-communist countries. Here we 
concentrate upon 10 post-communist countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Belarus. From this range of countries we 
can discern three main paths of transition in terms of political, social and economic 
transformations. They are the Central European path, the Eastern European path and the 
Southern European path. Although political and economic transformations have been 
relatively well documented, there has been less information about social transformation in 
any systematic or comparative sense. In this paper, we draw upon indicators of social 
transformation using longitudinal survey data in order to explore ways in which social 
transformation can be explored in comparative perspective.
Zusammenfassung
Die sozialen Veränderungen im Zuge der "Sanften Revolution” von 1989 hatten tiefgreifende 
Auswirkungen auf die osteuropäischen Länder. Viele seither publizierte Texte, die das 
Phänomen des “postkommunistischen Übergangs” zum Thema haben, generalisieren die 
Erfahrungen eines Landes oder einiger weniger Linder, obwohl sich in den einzelnen 
Ländern unterschiedliche Transformationsmodi zeigen.
In diesem Artikel werden die Veränderungen in zehn postkommunistischen Ländern 
behandelt: Polen, Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Slowenien, Kroatien, Rumänien, Bulgarien, 
Ukraine und Weißrußland. Innerhalb dieser Länder sind drei generelle Transformationsmodi 
bezüglich politischer, sozialer und ökonomischer Veränderungen feststellbar, nämlich der 
zentraleuropäische, der osteuropäische und der südeuropäische Modus. Während politische 
und ökonomische Veränderungen bisher relativ ausführlich dokumentiert wurden, gibt es nur 
wenige systematische Untersuchungen bezüglich der sozialen Veränderungen im Länder­
vergleich. Der vorliegende Artikel behandelt diese Veränderungen anhand von Längsschnitt­
daten, um Wege aufzuzeigen, wie soziale Transformationen in einer komparativen 
Perspektive analysiert werden können.
Acknowledgements: We would like to acknowledge many discussions with Cezary 
Milonsinski from which many of these ideas emerged and also his commentary on an early 
draft of the text.
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A considerable literature has now appeared on "transitology" which seeks to analyse the 
changes taking place in post-communist Europe - even journals have appeared specialising 
in this task. However, there is a tendency to generalise about "post-communism" based 
upon one or a very small number of countries. Our argument is that the apparent uniformity 
imposed by communism on Eastern European countries disguised many important 
differences between them. Moreover, now, nearly ten years after the so-called "revolutions" 
there is an increasing diversity of developmental patterns among these countries. We 
analyse only the East-Central European block of post-communist countries (Poland, 
Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, Croatia and 
Slovenia). Based upon our longitudinal .survey data alongside macro-economic data, we can 
define three separate paths of transformation as emerging.
Communist modernisation imposed an apparent conformity upon societies in East Central 
Europe through a model of forced development. Industries and land were nationalised, 
populations were rapidly urbanised and housed in high rise blocks, the means of production 
and exchange were controlled by the state and the state was controlled by the Communist 
Party. Universal education produced a strata of educated intelligentsia who were unable to 
climb to powerful positions unless they joined the political nomenklatura. There were also 
important differences even within communism. In Poland, for example, there was extensive 
private land ownership, whilst in Hungary under the later decades of Kadarism, a semi- 
private sector also developed. In the Czech Republic, the industrialisation which already 
existed before communism was redirected through the communist model of modernisation. 
Romania and the former Yugoslavia distanced themselves from Soviet domination, whereas 
the other countries were governed ultimately from Moscow. However, despite this variation, 
we could say that a particular model of political, economic and societal modernisation 
dominated these countries based up a version of Marxist theory.
All of these countries gained their autonomy from this system within the space of a few years 
between 1988 and 1992. In some countries this was the result of popular protest, which was 
not crushed by Soviet military intervention, as had happened on previous occasions. 
Examples of this would be the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the student 
demonstrations in November 1989 in Prague. In most cases these were peaceful protests, 
although in Romania there was fighting and the former communist leader was shot rather 
than peacefully retired from power. In other countries, the revolution came not so much from 
below as from above with a change in the political elite, or even with a change only in some 
of the ideas of the political elite whilst the same people remained more or less in power. 
This was much more the case in Bulgaria, Belarus and Ukraine. In the latter two countries 
the important moment was the dissolution of the Soviet Union which granted, or forced them 
(depending upon how it is viewed) into independence. In each country the politics of 
national identity emerged more strongly as a result of these so-called revolutions and politics 
became more "ethnicised" (Offe, 1995). In the countries which formerly formed Yugoslavia
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this resulted in civil war and their independence from communism and from each other took 
place only with violence.
Although the complex processes referred to above are often referred to as the "transition" 
from communism, this begs the question of what it is a transition to. In the beginning it was 
believed that this was simply a transition from communist society to democratic market 
societies (Vecernik, 1996) (Staniszkis, 1991). Now there is no longer any such certainty. 
Although it is clear what there is a transition from, the direction taken by the changes in these 
various societies if often far from clear and there is sometimes more what could be 
described as a de-modernisation, or collapse of former institutions rather than a new phase 
of capitalist modernisation. It is no longer clear that a democratic market society is 
necessarily the end product of this transition, as was originally believed in the optimistic post­
revolutionary period in the early 90's. For this reason, it is better to speak of transformation 
as an open-ended historical process rather than transition. Some kind of transformation did 
undoubtedly take place, but we do not hold any assumptions that this represented linear 
development in any particular direction and a clear goal, as the idea of transition implies.
Theories of Transformation
We can also distinguish different kinds of transformation. In the post-communist 
transformation of East-Central Europe things happened with varying speed. Ralph 
Dahrendorf (Dahrendorf, 1991) for example, argued that whilst political transformation might 
be fairly rapid and economic transformation could be introduced within a few years, social 
transformation was a much slower process and would take decades. Claus Offe {Offe, 1994) 
on the other hand, argued that political and economic transformation might even conflict with 
one another.
On account of the interest of the international community in these transformations, the 
economic changes have been fairly well documented. It is possible to find statistics about 
inflation, unemployment and GDP fairly readily, produced by a variety of international bodies 
and these indicators are often used to describe the "progress" of different Eastern European 
societies. However, aggregated economic indicators, whilst they have improved in quality 
since the early 1990s, may still be based upon data which does not necessarily follow market 
capitalist principles and EUROSTAT-standards (there are allegations that those for Belarus, 
for example, are falsified to give an impression of stupendous economic growth)1. 
Furthermore, the considerable informal economy in most of these societies means that a 
large proportion of people's actual economic activity is not measured by formal indicators 
(Sik, 1993) (Rose & Haerpfer, 1992). Finally, these aggregated economic indicators at the 
macro-economic level tell us nothing of the experience of different sub-groups and
’R ep o rt by  L avon Z lo tn ikau  in RFE/RL N ew slin e  Vol 2  No. 5 8 , 2 5 th  M arch  1 9 9 8 .
I H S — Wallace/Haerpfer/  Three Paths of Transformation — 3
households. Economic transformation is therefore fairly well documented but in a rather 
limited way.
Political transformation is also quite well documented with a range of texts emerging about 
elections and party formation (see for example (Wightman, 1995) (Henderson & Robinson, 
1997) and (Przeworski, 1991)). The party systems and elections are relatively straightforward 
to collect data about - although perhaps less straightforward to interpret (see the series 
edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Charles Taylor about founding elections in Eastern 
Europe, (Toka, 1995) (Gabal, 1996) (Karasimeonov, 1997) (Siber, 1997) (Goati, 1998)). The 
political opinions and patterns of political attitudes of the population are less straightforward 
to collect, although texts are emerging based upon empirical data which analyse these 
(Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998).
Social transformation is less well documented and much more difficult to define. Polish, 
Hungarian and Czech sociologists have for some years been developing concepts and 
documenting different aspects of social transformations (see (Vecernik, 1996) (Connor & 
Ploszajski, 1992) and Ploszajski) (Machonin, 1992) (Adamski, 1992) (Wnuk-lipinski, 1995) 
(Rychard, 1993) (Staniszkis, 1991)). They have been trying to make sense of the 
connections between the past, present and future of their societies and have been concerned 
to document the contradictions and problems in the process of transformation. Moreover, 
these social scientists are usually trying to explain the changes in their own societies. The 
ideas of these social scientists have therefore influenced us in trying to develop explanations 
for the patterns of variation in the empirical data which we have collected. The challenge is to 
develop ways of understanding post-communist transformation which are sensitive to the 
conditions in those societies and deriving from the empirical reality which exists there. Here 
we will try to use some of these ideas to look at changes in a comparative perspective.
Political, economic and social transformations merge when we look at real events which have 
taken place. Thus, for example, the political elite has been busy converting its "political 
capital" into real capital during the course of transformation and many members have 
become the new plutocrats, an important element of social and cultural stratification 
(Staniszkis, 1991). As a consequence, they still exert considerable power over the state and 
over the political leaders. In addition, following the tradition of Polanyi, we could say that 
economic decisions are not made according to abstract, formal principles but rather are 
embedded in the real everyday behaviour of social groups (Bryant & Mokrzycki, 1994).
We shall outline three mains sets of ideas derived from this literature in trying to elucidate the 
different kinds of transformations taking place in the 10 countries under consideration. They 
could be described as theories and concepts of the macro, micro and meso levels. First, at 
the macro level, a number of sociologists have looked at structural tensions between change 
and stasis at a systemic level (see for example (Rychard, 1993) and (Staniszkis, 1991)). If 
they use empirical data at all it is to illustrate their theoretical arguments.
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A second group of sociologists have concentrated more on the micro level of analysis. They 
have looked from the bottom up perspective at what households and individuals are actually 
doing and thinking, at individual behaviour and attitudes rather than constructing grand 
theories of transformation. Examples of this are Sik (Sik, 1998), Vecernik (Vecernik, 1996) 
and ourselves (Wallace and Haerpfer, 1998) (Wallace, 1998). Some in this tradition have 
concentrated upon new forms of inequality and poverty (Ferge, Sik, & Vecernik, 1996). 
Others have looked at the changes in behaviour following the changing conditions (Mozny, 
1994). This tradition is rooted more in empirical analysis.
Finally there are ideas developed at the meso level. These are often the ideas of the 
sociologists who began at the micro level and try in an inductive manner to develop middle- 
level theories to understand and explain the situations that they are describing (as is the case 
with the work of Ivo Mozny and Martin Potucek, Jiri Vecernik or Zsuzsa Ferge for example). 
Alternatively, they apply ideas and concepts derived from a more global social science 
literature but in ways particular to their own societies, but rooted in empirical analysis. This is 
the case with the work of Zsuzsa Ferge and Endre Sik.
Examples of these meso level explanations which are helpful in understanding social 
transformation are those of "path dependency" "social capital" and "household strategies". 
Endre Sik, for example, has developed the concept of "path dependency" (Sik, 1998) . Sik 
demonstrates how we can understand the development of transformations in post-communist 
societies we need to look at the way in which small and sometimes fairly arbitrary changes or 
institutions can set the path of development in quite unforeseen ways by looking at the 
development of open air markets in Hungary.
The path dependency approach is not simply fashionable and sophisticated revival 
of historical determinism. In its original form this approach assumes and institutional
framework in which actors make "embedded" but not fully determined decisions.... it
is not only the small and unforeseen nature of events that can create history. It is 
important to understand both the dynamics of the path dependent approach as 
explaining contemporaneous phenomena and also the way in which decisions made 
and institutions created within this framework can have unintended influences upon 
the future as well... Thus even the most carefully planned and designed institution 
(from a constitution to a new machine) can have unforeseen long term 
consequences. (Sik 1998:5-6)
Thus, once an institutional reform has been introduced in a particular way, this has 
repercussions for what comes later. This concept is useful for us here because it can help to 
explain the increasing diversification amongst the post-communist countries which we are 
considering.
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Some sociologists, for example, have argued that the socialist distribution system created a 
certain kind of social structure, with vested interest groups who now shape the path of social 
transformation and are unwilling to let go of their positions (Mokrzycki, 1993). This is why, for 
example, the privatisation of some large enterprises and industries has been stalled or 
diverted in particular ways because the people working in those enterprises are able to resort 
to various kinds of pressure and lobbying to preserve them, even when they are giant loss- 
makers (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1995).
The concept of social capital developed also by Endre Sik and others has been used to help 
to explain the way in which investment in social networks and connections, already important 
in the communist period, also becomes a way of securing resources and insuring against the 
prevailing economic insecurity in post-communist societies (Stark, 1991), (Sik, 1994), 
(Wallace, Chmouliar, & Bedzir, 1997), (Kolankiewicz, 1996), (Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer,
1997). Social capital, thus can be important not only in the survival of some families but also 
in the constructing the new forms of stratification emerging. Mozny has argued that for the 
top strata it is a way of accumulating and securing wealth and amongst the bottom strata it is 
a way of ensuring economic survival2.
The concept of household strategies and the informal economy has likewise been developed 
as a meso-level concept in the course of explaining social transformation. Richard Rose has 
both theorised and documented how households use the informal economy, drawing upon 
different sources of assistance, such as using foreign currencies, self provisioning of 
vegetables and food, second job holding, using help from friends and relatives, or accepting 
paid help from friends and relatives (Rose & Haerpfer, 1992). This has been developed more 
recently by Timo Piirainen in looking at Russia (Piirainen, 1997). Piirainen argues that the 
new forms of stratfication emerging in Russia depend upon whether households are oriented 
towards integrating themselves into the newly emerging market economy or into the more 
traditional style Soviet economy. Informal activity could be either defensive and traditional - 
taking the form of household self-provisioning for example - or more enterprising through 
using informal as well as formal market mechanisms. These strategies would likely 
determine whether the household was upwardly or downwardly mobile.
Stratification studies often begin at either a macro or a meso level with a priori concepts of 
status. These were often useful in the past for looking at, for example social mobility in 
communist societies when the situation was for many years rather stable and social 
categories plainly structured (see for example (Mateju, 1990). However, in a rapidly 
changing situation such as that prevailing in post-communist societies these are not 
necessarily the most appropriate methods (Kolankiewicz, 1996). In situations where private 
fortunes are rapidly and mysteriously accumulated much information about this is not 
accessible from traditional stratification studies. Moreover, high status people are not
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necessarily high earners (train drivers still earn more than senior doctors in many post­
communist societies) and the divisions between public and private sector mean that a 
"manager" in one sector can have a wholly different life-style to a manager in another. The 
communist-era status groups still exist together with new market-derived status groups. New 
cultural and life-style cleavages are emerging (Sampson, 1996). This illustrates the 
importance rather of using micro level approaches - studying first what is there and also the 
use of concepts such as social capital, path dependency and household strategies in order to 
understand social transformation in these contexts rather than only traditional notions of class 
and status. Thus, the new proposals for studying social stratification from Kolankiewicz, 
Piirainen and others tend to be based upon meso-level concepts. However, as Ray (Pahl, 
1996) has indicated in his commentary on Kolankiewicz, this does not necessarily amount to 
a new theory of stratification in post-communist societies. For that to emerge there need to 
be new links made between the macro, micro and meso levels of social analysis.
There is thus a danger on the one side of theorising without any empirical data or of using a 
priori categories which may no longer be applicable. On the other side there is a danger of 
having detailed empirical data about one country from which it is difficult to generalise about 
"social transformation" generally. Here we try to go beyond this by considering empirical data 
at a cross national level, using data provided by households and individuals in the ten post­
communist countries. We will use the responses provided by individuals as indicators of 
different features of transformation. As social scientists coming more from the micro level, we 
would emphasise the importance of looking at individual responses to structural changes in 
society and as a balance against the more usual use of aggregated economic and statistical 
data (for examples in measures of GDP, industrial output etc.). This follows from the 
approach developed in political science by Richard Rose (Rose, 1989). We do not have 
complete data (a more systematic analysis of social transformation is currently the object of a 
research application) but what we are trying to do here is to map out some of the patterns of 
response in different geographical contexts. The contexts are of course not only geographical 
but reflect different cultural and historical traditions which are "path dependent". In doing this 
we encounter a further danger - that of generalising across very different societies and 
regions, from a position of "outsiders" and the various misleading stereo-types and false 
assumptions that this can entail (see (Wallace, 1995)). This paper therefore represents only 
an attempt to try to understand some of the diversity in post-communist social transformation 
rather than claiming to be a definitive explanation for it.
Sources of data
We are mainly using the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) as our data source. This is a 
representative sample survey of approximately 1000 respondents per country in the following
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countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Ukraine and Belarus.
The NDB surveys were carried out at the following time points:
NDB 1: winter 1991/1992 
NDB II: winter 1992/3 
NDB III winter 1994/5 
NDB IV winter 1995/6
NDB V spring 1998 (not yet available for analysis).
Not all the countries were surveyed from the beginning, and some countries were only 
created over the lifetime of the survey, but most countries were surveyed on most occasions. 
Some questions were repeated each year, enabling comparisons over time, and other 
questions were only used in particular years. The survey is concerned mainly with attitudes 
towards political and economic change, so indicators of social transformation have to be 
derived from these. However, there was a body of questions each year about the economic 
activity of households, including their informal economic activity of various kinds (Rose & 
Haerpfer, 1992). We have also used where necessary comparative aggregated economic 
data.
Three forms of transformation
Following Ralph Dahrendorf (1991) we shall describe three forms of transformation: political, 
economic and social transformation. We can make analytical distinctions between them, 
although these forms of transformation are, of course, interrelated. They tend to be 
documented separately, which makes them also easier to describe in this way and although 
economic and political transformation tends to be quite well documented, social 
transformation is still a rather cloudy issue.
Political transformation
Post-communism began in Eastern Europe with a change in the leading political personnel, 
at least in the Central and Southern European countries. With no support from Moscow, the 
ruling communist-era elites mostly simply resigned from power, pushed out by popular reform 
movements. Multi-party systems were introduced and a system of free general elections, 
which sometimes, but not always, brought in a change in the political elite. The dissolution of 
communist-era supra-national institutions encouraged the development of nationalist politics
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and nationalistic demagogic leaders in some countries, leaders which used the authoritarian 
techniques learned from their communist predecessors to stay in power. In some cases this 
ethnicisation of politics had the effect of violent or other kinds of repression of minority groups 
and neighbouring countries.
Economic transformation
Economic transformation brought in increasing globalisation of post-communist economies 
with a range of international aid programmes and "advice" by international bodies. Foreign 
investment also flowed in, although not to the extent that was hoped, as the post-communist 
countries provide a cheap labour force and new markets for capitalist enterprises. The 
introduction of a more open labour market, rationalisation of traditional industries (although 
again, not as much as was expected) and the de-regulation (or partial de-regulation) of prices 
created a new economic environment which was felt immediately in the form of galloping 
inflation, falling real incomes and increasing numbers of people out of work. Reforms in 
social security and tax attempted to increase individual responsibility for welfare and to 
withdraw the state from key areas of the economy and society. One of these key areas was 
ownership of the means of production and exchange - privatisation of various kinds was 
introduced in all the post-communist countries. At one level the established enterprises were 
the subject of privatisation programmes to change their ownership, often using foreign 
investment. On the other hand new legal frameworks were provided for allowing the 
flourishing of new private enterprises. The informal economy, which had been important as 
a parallel form of supply and distribution under the old regime and a way in which families 
survived the state system, took on new roles and became also more "marketised". Thus, 
trading as well as self-provisioning became more important, and entrepreneurial activity was 
born out of the "hidden economy", particularly in countries where the legalised forms of 
business activity were limited (Wallace et al., 1997)
Social transformation
Whereas the former regimes tried to ensure social inequality, equality of incomes and of 
access to social goods (in practice this varied a great deal), this forced egalitarianism is now 
replaced by increasing differentiation according to social groups. Wealth is increasing the 
source of difference rather membership of the Party or nomenklatura as was the case 
previously. Many people have suffered poverty as a result of these changes as inflation has 
eroded incomes, especially those in the public sector. The "winners" of the transformation 
process, at least in the form of their attitudes, are people living in urban areas, especially 
capital cities, the younger people and the highly educated. The young "entrepreneurs" are the 
most obvious winners. The "losers" are the unemployed, children and semi-and un-skilled 
workers (Ferge, 1996) (Wallace, 1997). Households and individuals are linked in different 
ways into the capitalist market economy through the labour market and through the process 
of consumption as private property becomes increasingly a source of differentiation amongst
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population groups as land can be bought and sold, flats and houses purchased and cars and 
other goods become more readily available for those who can afford them. Participation in 
the private market sector and conspicuous consumption became forms of social 
differentiation which were previously suppressed. Ownership of consumer goods and life­
style can therefore be an important indicator of social differentiation (Sampson, 1996). 
However, the old "socialist" sectors of the economy still continue with large enterprises and 
state or collective farms employing large numbers of people, usually on very low wages and 
sometimes with forced "holidays" of non-payment. The middle class in the public sector 
(doctors, teachers etc.) continue to do badly with declining resources and low wages, whilst 
those in the private sector or working for international companies do very well.
Longitudinal data analysis indicates that there is a crystallisation of different attitudinal groups 
in post-communist societies with some being pro and some anti-reform and that these groups 
are associated increasingly with definable social characteristics (Vecernik, 1996) (Wallace,
1998). Whereas in the early post-communist period everyone was simply against the old 
system, we can now find groups who are for and against with different value orientations. 
This implies that some kind of new social structure is emerging (Wallace, 1998).
Because the process of privatisation and introduction of markets could not always 
successfully be controlled by the state and in some cases was distorted by armed conflicts, 
much economic "entrepreneurship" takes places outside of the state regulation. Thus, 
corruption continues to play an important part and in some regions is even increasing in 
importance. In some cases corruption shades into criminal "Mafia" type interests who have 
links with the state bureaucracy and can influence the political elite and may even control 
whole parts of the economy.
The former forced equality between genders and ethnic minorities has also given way to 
increasing differentiation, often to the cost of women and certain ethnic groups such as 
Roma (Funk and Muller, 1993). However, the situation is very complex and worthy of more 
intensive study. The forced equality of men and women under the former regimes concealed 
the considerable domestic burdens of women and now it is often women's skills which are 
valued in the newly emerging service sectors. Gender transformations have not been 
documented as an integral part of social transformations generally (Wallace & Fine, 1996).
Civil society has been an important topic of interest in understanding post-communist 
transformations since it was argued that the division between the nomenklatura "rulers" and 
the rest of the society who were only "ruled", wiped out the middle layers of associational and 
institutional life through which people could participate in their own societies (Staniszkis, 
1991) and which would operate as a check upon the power of politicians and capitalists 
under conditions of post-communist transformation (Keane, 1988). Building such institutions 
is a slow process and Vaclav Havel in a recent speech declared himself disappointed that 
the economic reforms have been prioritised at the expense of "civil society" in the Czech
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Republic. Nevertheless, there has been development of civil society, including clubs and 
associations for different professional, groups, the development of charities and non­
governmental organisations and more civic participation in local government and regional 
projects in post-communist countries.
The extent and impact of these changes is however, very variable in Central and Eastern 
Europe, as we shall show next.
The Three Paths of Transition
In the following chart we have distinguished three paths of transition associated with the 
three regions: Central Europe, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. We have also 
summarised the data according to political, economic and social transformations. In 
summary, we could say that the Central European path of transformation is the one which is 
leading those societies more in the direction of a western European model, albeit western 
European societies with dominant states and egalitarian tendencies. These countries have 
embraced reform. The Southern European countries appear to be going in the same direction 
but in a more faltering way with more ethnic, economic and political instability. The countries 
of the Eastern European are perhaps not even developing in this direction at all and in their 
case we can see more a collapse of former institutions without them being replaced by viable 
alternatives.
This analysis began as a way of trying to explain why the countries of Central Europe 
(elsewhere we have termed them the "buffer zone") have attracted migrants from countries 
to the East and South (Wallace, Chmouliar, & Sidorenko, 1996). We now present a more 
fully developed regional analysis of these imbalances.
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Political
Transformation
Economic
Transformation
Central Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe
Consolidation of multi­
party system.
2-3 elections. 
Increasing political 
stability.
Multi-party system but 
political instability.
2-3 elections. 
Anti-democratic forces 
also very strong.
Few political parties. 
Former communists 
very strongly repre­
sented - usually they 
are the political elite. 
Elections not well 
established - low turn 
out or abolished.
New democratic leaders Tendency towards
authoritarian/nationalist
leaders.
Some old communists 
reborn as nationalists.
Old communist leaders 
mainly in power.
Consensus amongst 
political elite for market 
system and democracy
No strong consensus 
amongst political elite. 
Also nationalist and 
authoritarian 
tendencies.
No reform wanted or 
little reform.
Population generally 
very pro-democratic
Population generally 
very pro-democratic
Large part of population 
preferred previous 
regime.
Peaceful resolution of 
minority problems and 
borders.
Recurrent problems with 
minorities and borders. 
Civil war.
Few problems with 
minorities or borders 
except for pro and anti- 
Russian faction.
Much foreign 
investment and 
European/international 
aid programmes.
Some foreign 
investment and 
European/international 
aid programmes.
Very little foreign 
investment or 
international aid 
programmes except in 
the area of nuclear 
arms.
Rising incomes and 
economic growth after 
initial fall.
Slow economic growth, 
lower incomes.
Very low incomes, 
continuing decline of 
economic growth
Inflation high but under 
control.
Very high inflation Hyper-inflation and 
economic instability
Extensive privatisation Limited privatisation - 
often not successful
Very limited or no 
privatisation
Tax reform and 
introduction of social 
security system
Some reforms in tax 
and social security
No reform in tax and 
social security
Separation of state and 
other expenditure
Some separation of 
different expenditures
Controlled by state 
expenditure
Population mostly pro- 
economic reform
Population mostly pro- 
economic reform
Many people against 
reforms
Informal economy 
important but declining 
because more formal 
ways of making a living 
are available
Informal economy still 
very important
Growing Informal 
economy is main way to 
survive due to collapse 
or crisis of formal 
economy.
High unemployment Very high 
unemployment
Low unemployment and 
non-payment of wages
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Social
Transformation
The Central European Path
In our survey, this includes the following countries: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovenia.
Political Transformation
In these countries the early coalition of forces opposing the communists which consisted in 
different countries of trades unions, green movements, dissident intellectuals, the Roman 
Catholic church, and so on formed the first democratic governments after the retreat from 
power of the former communist leaders. In the next few years this broad opposition front 
fragmented into a myriad different parties - some consisting of only a few members. These 
parties did not really represent any population groups. At this time it was difficult to 
distinguish left from right or other more conventional political alignments and parties included 
for example the "Beer drinkers" Party which represented not so much a set of political 
interests as a style of life. After one or two elections, these parties consolidated into broad 
blocks and coalitions representing more conventional left-right and liberal divides (Rose et 
al., 1998). Although socialist parties have been influential in all these countries, and they 
may contain former communists, they are generally more recognisable as social democratic 
parties in the Western European sense and are recognised as part of the socialist 
international.
These parties have thrown up new leaders which may have had no roots in the former 
system, or may indeed have been dissidents in the former system. Although at first these 
parties were not connected with any social power bases, increasingly there is the 
development of interest groups which are connected with particular political parties, as is the 
case in Western European societies. There has been a process of what Henderson and 
Robinson (1997) have termed "crystallisation" of party politics. In general, the political elite, 
no matter what their background, support the market and democratic reforms, which is why
New market oriented 
middle class developing 
Private and public 
sector distinction.Old 
industries alongside 
new market sectors.
Middle class 
underdeveloped. 
Tendency towards 
criminal control of 
economic interests
Small strata of 
nouveaux riches. 
Everyone else poor. 
Private sector limited 
apart from in informal 
economy
Corruption low Corruption high Corruption very high
Civil society developing Civil society nascent Not much civil society
Ownership of consumer 
goods high and growing 
rapidly
Ownership of consumer 
goods fairly high.
Ownership of consumer 
goods very low.
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there is not much difference in policies when socialist parties are elected to power. They 
may however, disagree about the pace of reform and the way in which it is carried out.
A priority for all these governments when they came to power was to stabilise their borders 
which were drawn up after the second world war, often under coercive circumstances. 
These border disputes were peacefully resolved after negotiation with neighbouring 
countries. Each of these countries contains national minorities of various kinds, but despite 
the fact that démocratisation has given a more a strident voice to these national minorities, 
they have generally been peacefully incorporated into the democratic process. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia, the tensions developed by the demands for more autonomy by Slovakia 
were resolved by negotiation when the country divided into two separate states (see Chart 
1)3.
The Central European concept of "minority" is one of a group which is fairly well assimilated 
already, since these are relatively homogenous ethnic communities, ones in which minorities 
questions were "solved" by a range of purges and by the holocaust fifty years ago. Hence, 
although there are a large number of Slovaks in the Czech Republic, for example, they do not 
represent a very distinct national minority there.
The Central Europeans have consistently supported the current political system and the 
process of democratic reform (see Chart 3), have been more negative about the communist 
political system and more positive about the future political system than people in the other 
two clusters of countries.
Economic Transformation
The Central European countries have benefited from a range of international aid programmes 
such as TEMPUS, PHARE and have had a steady stream of foreign advisors from 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and so on. These programmes have helped to further stabilise a peaceful 
transition to democratic capitalism. These countries have also benefited from foreign 
investment, joint ventures and other forms of economic assistance. Thus, in Chart 5 we can 
see a steadily rising pattern of incomes, diverging increasingly from our other two clusters of 
countries.
The result has been that these countries could be said to be examples of successful 
economic transformation. Although in the first few years of transition, production and incomes 
fell dramatically and Inflation rose, inflation is generally under control now and production and 
incomes started to pick up from the mid-1990s. Chart 6 shows the relative inflation rates of
3H o w ev er, S lovak ia  h a s  h a d  on -g o in g  d ip lo m atic  a rg u m e n t w ith  H ungary  a ro u n d  th e  p re s e n s e  o f th e  
H ungarian  m inority  th e re , w h ic h  r e p re s e n ts  a b o u t 1 2 %  of th e  p o p u la tio n .
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the three clusters of countries, although we should bear in mind that even in the Central 
European group of countries, inflation is still high.
However, these improvements have tended to be at the expense of high unemployment. 
Unemployment has been high in all of these countries {except the Czech Republic - but 
unemployment is also rising there over the last year) and this reflects the rationalisation of 
various industries and the impact of neo-liberal policies in the labour market. In Chart 7 we 
can see that unemployment rates remain at a steadily high level, over 10% on average.
Each of these Central European countries has introduced a privatisation programme (except 
Slovenia) which has been relatively ambitious. In Hungary, enterprises were privatised in 
such a way that managers, who had previously also exerted a lot of power, retained a great 
deal of influence. In Poland, because of the strength of the Solidarity movement, the workers 
in the enterprises were much more involved in the process an in the Czech Republic there 
was the attempt at a "citizens privatisation" through the use of vouchers (Frydman, 
Rapaczynski, & Earle, 1993). In practise, in both Hungary and Poland many key enterprises 
have not been privatised at all as the governments cannot afford the political unpopularity 
that this will bring, and itJs arguable that even the privatisation which appears to have taken 
place has resulted only in "recombinant property" relations rather than real privatisation 
(Stark 1996). That is, the ownership has changed but it is not necessarily fully in private 
hands. In the Czech Republic the apparently successful privatisation turns out to have been 
something of a sham so that "recombinant" property ownership is the result there too, with 
the state still holding a significant interest. However, in each of these countries the small 
privatisation, taking place mainly through auctions and leaseholds, has been a conspicuous 
success, encouraging a large undergrowth of small, private businesses which have been 
legally established and institutionalised (Earle, Frydman, Rapaczynski, & Turkowitz).
In each of the Central European countries, tax reform was introduced since 1993 with greater 
lesser success, so that individual taxation was introduced. The result is that the informal 
economy is transformed into a method of avoiding taxes rather than a method of survival, as 
it was in the past: the second economy existing under socialism became the "informal 
economy" in the words of (Sik, 1993) Queuing and surviving on home-grown produce, 
currency speculation and other more traditional "communist" forms of the informal economy 
(see (Rose & Haerpfer, 1992)virtually disappeared. Thus, in Chart 8 and 9 we can see that 
queuing or growing food became less and less important as a form of survival in the Central 
European countries. Corruption, although still a part of economic life in Central Europe (as is 
evident in all the scandals regarding bribes for politicians in the privatisation process) is the 
lowest of all our clusters of countries - an addition to the economy rather an institutionalised 
part of it (Nowotny, 1998). Economic reforms have been carried out generally in a rational 
legal way rather than in a criminal way.
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Linked to this taxation system as a way of paying for social expenditures, the governments in 
these countries have been attempting to separate different state functions and to link them to 
separate budgets. Thus, health services, education and so on whilst still funded mainly by 
the state, increasingly have their own budgets and social insurance has been introduced so 
that participants can fund themselves. Private institutions have also been introduced in many 
cases (Ringen and Wallace 1994a, Ringen and Wallace 1994b, Ringen and Wallace 1995).
Social Transformation
The relative success of the transformation in Central Europe is reflected in social 
transformation. A new middle class has been developing in Central Europe, based in the 
emerging service sector rather than in the old heavy industries. On the other hand, the 
managers and workers in large plants remain as important interest groups. New social 
cleavages have emerged between those working in the public or private sectors. In Chart 13 
we can see that in Central Europe people are less likely to work for the state and more likely 
to work in the private sector than is the case in the other two clusters of countries we are 
considering.
The general improvements in living standards and optimism about the economy and the 
political regime in Central Europe is reflected also in people's assessment of how their 
personal situation has changed. Chart 14 indicates that many people in Central Europe were 
able to earn enough from their main job to meet their needs - almost half, compared with only 
14% in the Eastern Europe. In Chart 15 we can see that the Central Europeans seldom or 
never had to do without basic necessities whereas in the Southern and Eastern European 
countries, this was often the case. Furthermore, Central Europeans were more optimistic 
about how long it would take them to reach a standard of living with which they were content 
(Chart 16). Another indicator of wealth was car ownership (Chart 17) and we can see that 
the Central Europeans are doing better here as well. In the deprivation indicators, Central 
Europeans are much less likely to have spent their savings and borrowed money in order to 
survive and many had even saved money (Chart 18). The final indicator which we use here 
is the individuals assessment of their situation in relation to the past, before the 
transformation began. They were asked about the differences between their present lifestyle 
and that under the former system. Here we see that the majority in every country felt that 
they were better off in the past than they are in the present, but this number is higher in the 
other two clusters of countries. Given this result, it is surprising really that so many people 
nevertheless support the general direction of economic and social change.
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The Southern European Path
In our surveys these countries included Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia.
Many of the reforms described in the Central European countries have also been introduced 
Political transformation
In the Southern European countries a multi-party political system has been introduced but 
there are also strong anti-democratic forces. Many of the former communist leaders became 
nationalist leaders, but use the same tactics to maintain power4. Democratic politics remain 
unstable and political parties have not "crystallised" into recognisable and stable blocks in the 
words of Henderson and Robinson (1997). Although there may have been elections in the 
Southern European countries, the governments are rather unstable, often unable to see 
through political or economic reforms (also sometimes unwilling to do this). Governments are 
likely to be overthrown or threatened by mass oppositional protest movements as was the 
case in Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 199617.
In the Balkan countries minorities and ethnic groups are regarded as problematic and there is 
not necessarily any clear resolution of these problems - although in some cases relations 
have been improved, as is the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Unlike in the 
Central European countries, the Southern European concept of a national minority is usually 
of a very distinct linguistic, cultural and religious group, often residing in particular regions. It 
is much less easy to assimilate such groups. Borders are disputed, especially in the former 
Yugoslavia and relationships with minority groups remain tense with the possibility of violence 
or repression. The people in Southern European countries are most likely to see the ethnic 
groups and minorities as a threat to the peace and security of their country (see Chart 1) 
(Haerpfer & Wallace, 1997).
Nevertheless, the people in the Southern European countries very strongly support 
democratic changes . To begin with, they were even more enthusiastic about democracy 
than were the Central Europeans, although this has fallen off a bit more recently (see Chart 
3). The people of the Southern European countries have little nostalgia for the previous 
communist regime and when asked about the future they are extremely optimistic. 
Therefore, despite the relative lack of success in the installation of democratic Institutions, the 
Balkan peoples are enthusiastic democrats and more resemble the Central Europeans in 
their attitudes, if not in their practices.
4For e x a m p le  by  su p p re s s in g  th e  m ed ia , p e rse c u tin g  o p p o sitio n a l g ro u p s  an d  by  W arning th e  " in te rn a tio n a l 
c o sm p o lita n  co n sp ira c y "  fo r d o m e s tic  p ro b lem s.
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Economic transformation
The Southern European countries have attracted some foreign investment and have been 
targets of European and international aid programmes, but their poverty and political 
instability has meant that they enjoy far lower investment than do the Central European 
countries. Incomes are generally much lower than in Central Europe, and do not seem to be 
rising and economic growth is lower. There is far higher inflation in the Southern European 
countries than in the Central European countries and in this respect they more resemble the 
Eastern European countries. There has been some privatisation, especially in Romania, but 
much of this has not brought about as many new private ventures and initiatives as in the 
Central European countries. The Southern European countries are more prone to stagger 
from one economic crisis to the next and this is particularly evident in Bulgaria last year with 
its hyper inflation and economic collapse which was generated first of all by lack of reform 
and political inertia. Nevertheless, in terms of the attitudes of the population, there is strong 
support for change and optimism about the future. The people of the Southern European 
countries are just as negative about the past economic system as are the Central Europeans, 
but are less enthusiastic about the present economic system, perhaps because of all the 
hardships and poverty it has brought to many people in these countries (see Charts 10 and 
11). They are also less optimistic about the future economic system (Chart 12). In the 
Southern European countries, a large number of people still work in the state sector, and if 
they work in the private sector, it is in new enterprises, reflecting the lack of privatisation 
generally. The high number of independent farmers in the Balkans reflects the fact that 
agriculture was privatised, but in such a way that many people in some regions were turned 
back into peasants. That is, they were restituted small unviable plots of land and a small 
number of livestock.
In the Southern European countries, corruption is more common (Nowotny, 1998) and this 
was further exacerbated by conditions of civil war and the international embargo on Serbia 
which encouraged a flourishing black market and a tradition of arms and fuel smuggling to 
beat the embargo. This in turn allowed the development of criminal groups who organised 
such activities, not only in the former Yugoslavia but also in neighbouring Bulgaria and 
Albania and these groups were later able to control whole sectors of the economy with links 
to the state, to politicians and to the privatisation process. The traditional informal economy 
is also important for many people in the population with growing food having a high priority 
(see Chart 9), although queuing has dropped dramatically since 1993 (Chart 8). The 
Southern European countries, have suffered the highest unemployment of all our country 
clusters, although this seems to be falling in 1996.
Social transformation
The middle class is underdeveloped in the Southern European countries and it may be linked 
to more criminal interests. Civil society is not so well developed and often takes the form of
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the representation of religious and ethnic minorities. There is clear stratification by ethnic 
groups, with the Hungarians and Germans in Romania, for example, holding a privileged 
position, whilst the Romanians are not so privileged. In Bulgaria, the Turks are an 
underprivileged group and in all countries Roma (Gypsies) form a distinct semi-criminal, 
semi-literate and often unemployed sub-strata to a much greater extent than is the case in 
the other countries we are considering. Roma often live in a parallel, separate society, either 
as nomads or within fenced off ghettos where other citizens seldom venture5.
The informal economy can also develop around ethnic groups as the stigmatised Roma and 
Turks find a niche in small-scale entrepreneurial activities such as trading, which it is more 
difficult for the dominant population to break into (Thuen, 1998; Konstantinov, 1998). These 
and other ethnic groups are able to use their Diaspora in other countries as a source of social 
capital in the course of developing capitalist market activity.
There is much poverty in the Balkan countries as the reforms have hit the population quite 
hard, but they began from a poorer position than the Central Europeans at the beginning of 
the transformation process (in the former Yugoslavia this situation was exacerbated by war 
and the international embargo). Nevertheless, 39% are able to live on their earned incomes, 
which is not as high as in Central Europe, but higher than in Eastern Europe. Car ownership 
is also relatively high, almost the same as in Central Europe. On the indictors of household 
personal poverty and deprivation, the Southern European countries fall between the Central 
Europeans and those of the Eastern Europe. They are more likely to do without than are the 
Central Europeans (Chart 15) and although few of them are content with their income, they 
are rather optimistic about how long it will take them to catch up (Chart 16). More of them 
have had to spend savings and borrow money in order to survive than is the case in Central 
Europe. Again, this optimism about the future and support of economic reforms is quite 
surprising when we look at the results represented in Chart 19 where only 16% felt that they 
are better off than they were in the past under the communist system. This represents 
perhaps the triumph of hope over experience.
The Eastern European path
Here we are considering only two countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine and Belarus, 
so our conclusions cannot be generalised to other countries. Within wider Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union very different transition paths can be discerned, but these are 
not the topic of our paper.
5Sijka K o v a tc h e v a , p e rso n a l c o m m u n ic a tio n .
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Political transformation
In Ukraine and Belarus, there are relatively few political parties. The transition from 
Communism did not take place because of popular national movements, but rather autonomy 
was granted from Moscow and left to local leaders to define. It should be said, however, that 
there were also strong nationalist tendencies in Western Ukraine which encouraged 
Ukrainian autonomy and its departure from the CIS. Of these two countries, Ukraine has 
moved in a westward-looking direction even if the reforms have been beset by many 
problems. However, Belarus, having held only one election, is increasingly undemocratic in 
its orientation and the president has censored the media, prevented elections and persecuted 
oppositional voices. Even in Ukraine, the elections have only brought in the traditional 
communist leaders6. The result is that these leaders have brought with them the same 
Soviet-style Ideas with which they worked in the former system and which are embodied in 
their own social mobility. Therefore, reforms have been prevented or introduced in a very 
piecemeal way and the style of government has a tendency to be authoritarian.
Although there are large minority populations in Belarus and Ukraine, and borders are far 
from secure, minority and ethnic problems are not perceived as threatening by the population 
(Chart 1). Indeed, we could say that these countries have potentially the most ethnic and 
minority/border problems of all the countries under consideration and yet they themselves 
see them as the least threatening. The main divide is between the Russian speakers and 
other groups. In Belarus even this is not a clear division and Belarus has been trying to draw 
closer to her big neighbour, Russia. Ukraine also faces a secessionist tendency among the 
Tartars of Crimea and there has been a strong division between the nationalist and 
Ukrainian-speaking western regions (for a while between the two World Wars these formed 
an independent country) and the Russian-speaking and more pro-Russian Eastern regions. 
This division between East and West is less unstable than it was in 1992 and represents 
perhaps one of the successes of the political leaders in forging a new country from potentially 
disparate parts. Their preoccupation with this and with the military issues and nuclear arms 
which they inherited (along with devastation of large parts of Belarussian and Ukrainian 
territory by the Chernobyl disaster) has been the main preoccupation of politicians rather than 
other kinds of political and economic reform. The difference in minority politics in this cluster 
of countries, when compared with Central and Southern Europe, is that they hold a third 
concept of "minority". In these former Soviet countries, there was an attempt to level minority 
status through participation in that greater supra-national entity, the Soviet Union. Thus, 
although people may have had a nationality entered on their passports, It was not of any 
great importance in these countries. Linguistic, cultural and religious differences are 
relatively minor, borders were not well established and the so-called "minority" population in 
these countries, the Russians, were formerly the majority population.
P r e s id e n t  K uchm a of U kraine w a s  fo rm erly  d ire c to r  o f a la rge  p lan t an d  P re s id e n t L u k ash en k o  of B e la rus w a s  
d ire c to r  o f a co llec tiv e  fa rm .
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Not only are the economic elite in favour of centralised control of the economy, but so are 
most of the population, for whom the previous regime represented relative security and the 
transformation period is one of alarming insecurity and pauperisation. Many feel that their 
nation has been humiliated by these reforms. It is not surprising then that the Communists 
did very well in the recent Ukrainian elections. We can see from Charts 2-4 that the people 
of Eastern Europe do not much like the current political system and generally preferred the 
previous system. They are also not as optimistic about the future as the other two country 
clusters.
Economic transformation
In the former-Soviet countries economic reform has been slow or non-existent. According to 
many of the indicators, their economies have gone into reverse, with sinking production, high 
inflation and declining living standards among the population. Incomes have plummeted from 
an already low level as we can see in Chart 5 and inflation has soared as we see in Chart 6. 
These countries have attracted very little foreign investment and have not introduced laws to 
shelter private investments. Although unemployment is very low in these countries, many 
people are either not working or not paid (see Chart 7) and are therefore even worse off than 
unemployed people in the other countries, who at least usually receive some benefits. The 
preferred labour market policy is to retain the workers even if the factory is not operating and 
people tended to acquiesce in this for fear of finding nothing else. The lack of tax reform is 
also reflected in the fact that most parts of the economy are state controlled and still 
dependent upon state expenditure. We can see from Chart 13, where people are working, 
that the private sector is very underdeveloped.
Because the living conditions of much of the population are extremely poor and have even 
declined, they depend to a great extent upon the informal economy for economic survival and 
many traditional "communist-era" practises, such as queuing, which has not changed at all by 
1994, reflecting an on-going economics of shortage (Chart 8). Many people resort to growing 
food, currency speculation and other forms of traditional survival outside the formal economy 
in former communist countries (Chart 9). This is in contrast to the other countries we are 
considering here where many of these practices have died out and the informal economy has 
evolved into new forms (Sik, 1993). The new entrepreneurial activity often takes place in this 
hidden or illegal sector because the basis for a more legally established group of small 
entrepreneurs is not there (Wallace et al., 1997).
Not surprisingly, there is great scepticism about the current economic system and rising 
support for the previous economic system, which was far more stable. However, the people 
of Eastern Europe are cautiously optimistic about the future (Chart 12).
We could say therefore, that economic transformation in this region has been disastrous and 
although some economists argue that Ukraine is turning the comer in its economic fortunes,
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the crisis in the Belarussian currency in the earlier months of 1998 seem to indicate that the 
crisis there is only just beginning.
Social transformation
The societies of Belarus and Ukraine are divided between those who are extremely rich by 
European standards and spend their time and their money in Paris, Vienna, and the South of 
France the so-called ’’nouveaux riches" (about 5% of the population), and the majority of the 
population, who are extremely poor, no matter what their professions. Because of the 
importance of the informal economy, factors such as owing access to a garden where 
vegetables can be grown, or a car for transportation can be important factors in differentiating 
those who are able to survive well and those who are not able to survive so well. Ownership 
of consumer goods (as indicated by car ownership) is very low (Chart 17) and in these 
countries the gleaming German Mercedes and BMWs of the rich touch bumpers with the 
noisy and battered Soviet-era cars owned by most of the population, if they own a car at all.
Civil society is underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and could be said to be not part of the 
societies there in any traditional sense (Johnson, 1996). For this reason, capitalism is not 
controlled by any institutional and formal way, but rather tends to be controlled by powerful 
informal or criminal lobbies and interest groups (WIIW, 1997). The "Wild East" style of 
buccaneer capitalism is more evident. However, the lack of reform mean that large parts of 
the market have developed informally in a spontaneous way and new entrepreneurs are 
often hindered by taxation and other legislation rather than being helped by it. Thus for 
example, with many shops still empty of goods, people shop in large open air (mainly 
informal) markets which have sprung up everywhere to meet the demand for consumption 
(Wallace et al„ 1997)(Sik and Wallace, 1998).
The poor performance indicated by the macro-economic indicators in Charts 5 and 6 is 
reflected in the immiseration of the people of Eastern Europe generally. Only 11 per cent of 
them felt that they were better off than they were in the past and 80 percent felt that they are 
worse off (Chart 19). Only 14% are able to live from their earned incomes and 50% have had 
to do without basic necessities, such as food, heating and clothing. People in Eastern 
Europe are also rather pessimistic about how long it will take them to catch up (Chart 16). 
Large numbers did not get by at all (Chart 18).
We could say therefore that for people of Eastern Europe the transformations have lead to 
increasing insecurity and falling living standards and little perceptible progress for the 
majority of the population.
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Discussion
We can see from this analysis so far that the countries of Eastern, Southern and Central 
Europe fall into separate categories according to a number of variables. However, in putting 
all these countries into groups in the interest of painting a broad picture, we have concealed 
some of the differences within these groups, which we should also mention.
Slovenia, we have classified as a Central European country, even though It was formerly part 
of Yugoslavia and could perhaps be described as "Southern". However, in terms of the 
transformations described here, it belongs firmly in the Central European group and Is indeed 
the wealthiest country in the Central European group. Slovakia, on the other hand has the 
kind of anti-democratic tendencies (suppression of the media, persecution of opposition 
parties and politicians, persecution of ethnic minorities and tendency to blame domestic 
problems on the "global cosmopolitan conspiracy") more typical of the Southern European 
group of countries or of Belarus. It is also run by an authoritarian and nationalist leader who 
uses demagogic forms of leadership. However, in terms of economic transformation, general 
well being and the attitudes of the population it belongs more in the Central European group. 
The people of Hungary, living in a relatively successful transition country, are consistently 
sceptical about the economic reforms and positive about the past, attitudes more typical of 
the Eastern group of countries, although Hungary does not resemble these countries in any 
other way.
Amongst the Southern European group, Romania has introduced a range of privatisation 
programmes and economic reforms relatively quickly, but the general level of political and 
economic development places it more firmly with the Southern Europeans. Croatia is the 
country most fervently in favour of market reforms of all our countries and would definitely 
see itself as part of "western Europe" rather than the Balkans, but its economic 
transformation has been retarded by war and as a democracy, it leaves much to be desired, 
being controlled by an authoritarian nationalist leader.
We have also touched upon the many differences between Belarus and Ukraine which we 
have classified together as "Eastern European".
There are therefore some countries within each cluster which represent the cluster more or 
less strongly and others which may be more typical of other clusters in some respects. Here 
we have tried to use general tendencies to classify these countries and we still believe that 
these tendencies have some general analytical value in describing transformation in post­
communist East-Central Europe.
Clearly, our different parts of Europe also represent religious cleavages, with the Southern 
and Eastern countries having mainly Orthodox faith (with the exception of Croatia) and the
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Central European countries having mainly a Catholic faith (with some Protestants in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary). For some, this represents the difference between a 
progressive, modern orientation and a backward Eastern one (Longworth, 1992). However, 
we are not making any such assumptions and it seems to us that differences in religion are 
better explained by the geographical locations of different countries which in turn reflect the 
"path dependent" social, economic and political transformations taking place there.
An issue raised by this analysis is whether these are really separate paths of development or 
whether they are really ranged along a continuum. A popular way of interpreting these 
change is in terms of "progress" towards capitalist democracy and many of the indicators we 
have used are also used to "measure" the "extent" of this progress. In this interpretation, the 
Central European countries are in the most "advanced" league and the Eastern European 
countries have the most "backward" level of development. However, they are linked 
together, like the carriages of a train, so that they are all seen to be ultimately travelling in the 
same direction, only at different speeds. Eventually, in time, the more backward countries will 
"catch up" according to this model. If this model is correct, then we would expect the 
different post-communist countries to become more similar in the long term.
However, an alternative interpretation would be that they are really on different "paths" 
moving in different directions. Thus, the kind of capitalist democracy which is emerging in 
Central Europe has a distinctive form, whilst the kinds of societies emerging in the other 
regions likewise have different forms. They are forms based upon the historical and cultural 
configurations of the region and further developed through "path dependency" rather than 
representing different stages of some universal capitalist democratic ideal. It is not even clear 
that the capitalist democratic ideal is really the end product of all these paths, nor does it 
seem to be the most desirable among the populations in the Eastern European countries. If 
this model is correct, then as the transformation process works its way through, so we would 
expect these clusters of countries to become more different rather than more similar.
Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to sketch three paths of transformation in post-communist Europe 
and three levels of transformation. Among the paths of transformation, we can find firstly, the 
Central European group of countries which border the most prosperous parts of the 
European Union and are scheduled to become members in the nearest future. Here, the 
transformation has been most progressive with the establishment of viable market and 
democratic systems and with a market capitalist society of some type developing. Secondly, 
we can define the Southern cluster of countries where there have also been attempts to put 
into practice democratic and market reform, but where these are not so well established. The 
transformation is moved in different directions by antagonism with ethnic and minority groups
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an in some case warfare or the consequences of international embargo. Thirdly, we can 
define the Eastern European group of countries where market and democratic systems are 
hardly established and where much of the population prefer quite a different direction of 
reform, one more similar to the old system.
We have looked at these paths in terms of three levels of transformation. The political and 
the economic level of transformation are well documented at least at an aggregate general 
level. However, the third level, social transformation, is not so well documented and research 
has been piecemeal. There is a need for new explanations and documentation at this level 
and in this article we have only given some indications of the directions this might take.
In documenting these different kinds of transformation, we have drawn mainly upon micro­
level data sources - longitudinal repeated general surveys of the ten countries under 
consideration. We have tried to indicate that that explanations which do not take into 
account the attitudes and behaviour of the population in an empirically grounded form can be 
misleading. However, we have tried to show that from this micro-level data (which is mainly 
descriptive) it is possible to move towards meso level concepts and explanations and 
perhaps connect more systematically with macro-level theories. This building of theory from 
the bottom upwards is most appropriate in situations of rapid social change for which many 
traditional social theories are inadequate.
Whilst here we have presented mainly micro level data, we have also discussed some of the 
meso-level concepts which have been used to inform the understanding of social 
transformations, concepts such as path dependency, social capital, informal economy and 
house hold strategies. These concepts can explain a lot but do not of themselves create 
general explanations of social transformation. They need to be operationalised in ways which 
can take into account systematic comparisons between countries and between the different 
regimes emerging. The new forms of stratification, new forms of status and life-style, new 
gender regimes which are emerging require a more subtle and detailed analysis which goes 
beyond what we have attempted here. This represents only a small part of a much larger 
task for social scientists interested in post-communist transformation.
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Appendix: Charts
1 Minorities and ehtnic groups
2 Approval of communist political system
3 Approval of current political regime
4 Approval of future political system
5 GDP per capita: purchasing power parity
6 Inflation rates 1996
7 Unemployment rates
8 Queuing more than one hour per day
9 Growing food
10 Approval of past economic system
11 Approval of current economic system
12 Approval of future economic system
13 Place of work
14 Earning enough from main job
15 Doing without
16 Time before content with living standards
17 Car ownership
18 Spent savings or borrowed money in the last year
19 Situation in the past was

Chart 1
Minorities and ethnic groups
C entra l S o u th e rn  E aste rn
E u ro p e  E u rope E urope
Notes:
1 . For 1996
2 .  Question was “Ethnic Groups and Minorities are ....A big threat, Some threat, Little threat, No threat at all... to the peace 
and security o f  our country,”
3. Countries excluded: none
Chart 2
Approval of communist political system
.C e n tra l E urope 
S o u th e rn  E u rope
• E a s te rn  E urope
Notes:
1 . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put the former Communist regime?” Scale from minus 100 to plus 100. 
Chart shows only those agreeing.
3 .  Countries excluded: In NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
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Chart 3
Approval of current political regime
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Notes:
1 .  Tim e points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put our present system o f  governing with free elections and many 
parties?” Scale from minus 100 to plus 100. Chart shows only those above 0.
3 .  Countries excluded: In NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
■Central Europe
'Southern Europe
Eastern Europe
Chart 4
Approval of future political system
"C en tra l E u ro p e  
■ Southern  E urope 
E a s te rn  E u rope
II IV
Notes
1 . . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put our system o f  governing five years in the future?” Scale from 
minus 100 to plus 100. Chart shows only those scoring more than 0.
3 .  Countries excluded: In NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
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Chart 5
GDP per capita: purchasing power parity
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Notes:
Data compiled by WIIW No. 167. May 1997, p. 323 and WIIW No. 163 May 1996 
Countries excluded: Belarus from all time points 
Dollar equivalents, calculations are made by WIIW
Chart 6
Inflation rates 1996
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C entra l S o u th e rn  E aste rn
E u ro p e  E u rope E urope
Notes:
Data com piled by WIIW No. 167. May 1997, p. 323 and WIIW No. 163 May 1996 
Countries excluded: Belarus from all time points
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Chart 7
Unemployment rates
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Notes:
Data compiled by W IIW N o. 167. May 1997, p. 323 and W IIW N o. 163 May 1996 
Countries excluded: Belarus from all time points
Chart 8
Queuing more than one hour per day
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Notes:
1. Time points 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5
2 .  Question wording: “Do you or anyone in your household spend more than an hour a day queuing for things in shops?”
3 .  Countries included 1,11,111: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania
II, 111: Croatia, Belarus, Ukraine
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Chart 9
Growing food
B  Central Europe i
■  Southern Europe i
□  Eastern Europe !
N o tes:
1 . T im e  p o in t: 1996
2 . Q u es tio n  w o rd in g  “ W h ich  ac tiv ity  on  th is  card  is th e  m o st im p o rtan t for th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  liv in g  o f  your fam ily ?  
G ro w in g  food, R e p a irin g  th e  h o u se , W h a t w e g e t as fav o u rs , W h a t w e g e t w ith  h lp e  o f  frien d s , re la tiv es, 
B u y in g  g o o d s  w ith  fo re ig n  m o n ey , E a rn in g s  seco n d  jo b , In d id en ta l ea rn in g s , E a rn in g s  re g u la r  jo b . P en sio n , 
u n e m p lo y m e n t b en e fit, B e n e fits  a t p lace  o f  w o rk  such  as m eal, h o lid ay , D o n ’t k n o w ”
3. C o u n tr ie s  ex c lu d ed : no n e
Chart 10
Approval of past economic system
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Notes:
1 . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put the socialist economy before the revolution?" Scale from minus 
100 to plus 100. Chart shows only those agreeing.
3 .  Countries excluded: In NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
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Chart 11
Approval of current economic system
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Notes:
1 . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put our present econonic system ?" Scale from minus 100 to plus 100. 
Chart shows only those agreeing.
3 .  Countries excluded: ln NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
Chart 12
Approval of future economic system
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Notes:
1 . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “W here on this scale would you put our economic system in five years time?” Seale from minus 100 to 
plus 100. Chart shows only those with more than 0.
J . Countries excluded: In NDB 1 there were no data for Croatia, Belarus and Ukraine.
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Chart 13
Place of work
R567
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0  Central Europe
■  Southern Europe
□  Eastern Europe
Notes:
1 . Time point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: “What type o f employer do you have?”
3 .  Countries excluded: none
Chart 14
Earning enough from main job
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m m E a s te rn  E u rope
Notes:
1 . Time points: 1991/2, 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6
2 .  Question wording: “Do you get enough money from your regular job  to buy what your really need? Definitely enough, Just 
enough, not quite enough, Definitily enough” Chart includes people responding to first two categories.
3 .  Countries excluded: 1: Croatia, Ukraine, Belarus
IV: Belarus
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Chart 15
Doing without
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Notes:
1 . Time point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: “Sometimes people have to do without things that people usually have. In the past year has your 
household had to do without any o f the following: Food; Heating/electricity; Clothes you really need” Respondents were 
given the alternatives: Often, sometimes, rarely, never. The Chart is composed o f  combined responses to these questions 
with 0 points assigned for answering never to a question, 1 point rarely, 2 sometimes, 3 often. If  answered never to all 
three, classified here as never; 1-3 points rarely; 4-6 sometimes; 7-9 often.
3. Countries excluded: none
Chart 16
Time before content with living standards
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Notes:
1 . T im e point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: “How long do you think it will be before you have reached a standard o f  living with which you are 
content?”
3 .  Countries excluded: none
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Chart 17
Car ownership
Notes:
1 . Time point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: ‘'Does your household have any o f  the following....”
3 .  Countries excluded: Rom ania, Hungary, Poland
Chart 18
Spent savings or borrowed money in the last year
E a s te rn  E urope 
43%
C entral E urope 
— 22%
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--------------------  S o u th e rn  E urope
35%
Notes:
1 . Time point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: “In the past year, has your fam ily.....Saved money; Just got by; Spent some savings; Borrowed money;
Spent savings and borrowed m oney” Chart comprises people responding to the last three categories.
3 .  Countries excluded: Ukraine and Romania
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Chart 19
Situation in the past was
b e tte r  th e  s a m e  w o rse
Notes:
1 . Time point: 1996
2 .  Question wording: “When you compare your overall household economic situation with five years ago, before the big 
changes in the economy, would you say that in the past it was....M uch better; a little better; About the same; A little worse; 
Much worse
3 .  Countries excluded: none
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